The Council’s deliberations occurred against a backdrop of deteriorating roadway safety conditions as speed-related fatalities increased 50% between 2023 and 2024.

by Compass Vermont

On February 2, 2026, the Vermont Criminal Justice Council decided not to impose statewide restrictions that would have limited high-speed police chases to cases involving violent felonies. Initial coverage characterized this as a “reversal” of reform efforts, but that framing misses the central issue that shaped the Council’s thinking: growing evidence that suspects increasingly flee from police when they know pursuits are restricted, creating what law enforcement calls a “deterrence crisis” that may be more dangerous than the chases themselves.

Understanding the Council’s decision requires looking at roadway safety data largely absent from initial reporting, the practical enforcement challenges facing Vermont agencies, and critical findings about officer compliance with existing safety requirements—including the fact that the officer killed in Vermont’s most high-profile pursuit tragedy was not wearing a seatbelt.

Speed-Related Fatalities and the Deterrence Question

The Council’s deliberations occurred against a backdrop of deteriorating roadway safety conditions. According to Vermont Agency of Transportation crash data, speed-related fatalities increased 50% between 2023 and 2024, even as overall highway fatalities decreased 14% in 2024. Preliminary data for 2025 showed fatalities rising again with a 4% year-over-year increase.

The Vermont Association of Chiefs of Police argued this trend is directly connected to pursuit restrictions. According to comparative policy analysis examining pursuit standards across multiple states, field commanders report that when criminals understand police will not pursue them for non-violent offenses, eluding incidents increase and dangerous driving becomes more common. The logic is straightforward: if fleeing successfully means avoiding arrest, more suspects choose to flee.

This “impunity argument” became the primary justification for maintaining pursuit authority. Law enforcement leaders presented the Council with a stark choice: accept the risks of some pursuits, or accept the risks of emboldened drivers who know they can outrun the law.

What Other States Are Learning

Vermont’s situation is not unique. States that implemented highly restrictive pursuit laws in 2020-2021 have begun reconsidering those policies. Washington and California have modified or reversed pursuit restrictions implemented in recent years, citing rising crime rates, increased eluding incidents, and public safety concerns.

These reversals validate law enforcement’s warnings about unintended consequences. When suspects learn that certain offenses—car theft, retail theft, burglary—will not trigger pursuit, those crimes can increase. The policy question becomes whether the danger from pursuits is greater or lesser than the danger from unchecked fleeing and the broader climate of lawlessness that can follow.

The Tragedy That Revealed a Compliance Problem, Not a Policy Problem

The 2023 death of Rutland Police Officer Jessica Ebbighausen initially seemed to strengthen the case for categorical pursuit restrictions. The 19-year-old trainee was killed when her cruiser was struck head-on by a fleeing driver during a pursuit.

But the internal affairs report by Commander Sam Delpha released in late 2025 fundamentally reframed the conversation. The report concluded the fatality was “preventable” and that the pursuit should never have been initiated under the department’s existing policy, which already restricted chases to violent felonies. The underlying offense—a burglary—did not meet that threshold. Supervisors on duty failed to monitor and terminate the high-risk event.

Most significantly for the broader policy debate, Vermont media outlets reported that neither Ebbighausen nor her training officer were wearing seatbelts at the time of the collision. This finding demonstrated that the tragedy resulted from multiple failures—tactical violations, supervisory failures, and basic safety equipment non-compliance—rather than from pursuit activity itself.

This revelation changed the Council’s calculus. If Vermont’s most tragic pursuit incident occurred when officers violated an already-restrictive policy and ignored basic safety requirements, the problem wasn’t the absence of rules but the failure to follow them.

The Compliance Crisis in Vermont’s Largest Agency

The Vermont State Police experience reinforced this conclusion. VSP updated its pursuit policy in 2021 to include restrictive protocols designed to curtail high-risk chases. Yet internal reports show five troopers were disciplined for pursuit policy violations in the first half of 2023, and four more troopers faced discipline in the first half of 2024—making pursuit violations the most commonly cited infraction in disciplinary reports.

VSP Major David Petersen characterized this as a “shift in field practices” that takes time to become “ingrained in an organization’s culture.” If the state’s largest and best-resourced law enforcement agency struggles to enforce its own restrictive policy, forcing similar policies on hundreds of smaller municipal departments without equivalent supervisory infrastructure could be counterproductive or even dangerous.

A Different Approach

Characterizing the Council’s decision as a “reversal” misrepresents what actually happened. The state’s Use of Force policy updated in 2024 already requires that all force, including high-speed vehicle operation, must be “objectively reasonable” and “proportional” based on the totality of circumstances.

Individual agencies like the Vermont State Police maintain restrictive internal policies. The Council’s decision simply means there will not be an additional categorical statewide mandate limiting chases to violent felonies only. Each agency continues operating under existing policies and the “objectively reasonable” standard, with accountability enforced through professional regulation when violations occur.

The Council is betting that this approach—maintaining deterrence while improving compliance and removing problematic officers—better serves public safety than categorical restrictions that may encourage more dangerous eluding behavior.

Professional Regulation as the Accountability Mechanism

Rather than imposing rigid tactical rules, the Council is emphasizing removal of officers who demonstrate poor judgment. Under legislation including H.872, the Council developed a statewide police code of conduct and has increased enforcement actions against officers for unprofessional conduct.

Recent months have seen several permanent bans from Vermont law enforcement, including officers removed for road rage convictions, sexual harassment, and other conduct demonstrating poor judgment. The theory is that by removing officers who make bad decisions, the state can mitigate pursuit risks while maintaining the deterrent effect that keeps suspects from fleeing in the first place.

Reckless Motorists Have Changed Public Priorities

This shift from the 2020-2021 reform period reflects changing public priorities. As concerns about crime and road safety have grown, the political consensus has moved toward maintaining law enforcement tools—including pursuit authority—while improving accountability through professional regulation rather than categorical tactical restrictions.

What Happens Next

The effectiveness of Vermont’s approach will be measured through two key metrics: whether speed-related fatalities and eluding incidents decline, and whether internal affairs compliance with existing pursuit policies improves.

If the deterrence theory proves correct, maintaining pursuit authority should reduce eluding incidents and dangerous driving. If speed-related fatalities decline and compliance improves, it will validate the Council’s bet that the problem was enforcement of existing rules rather than absence of stricter ones.

Conversely, if pursuit-related deaths increase or compliance remains poor, pressure for categorical restrictions will likely return. Organizations like the ACLU that characterized the decision as “inaction” will argue the data proves their case.

The Vermont State Police will continue reporting on pursuit policy compliance through internal affairs investigations, while the Criminal Justice Council develops its code of conduct enforcement mechanisms. Together, these will test whether maintaining deterrence while improving officer accountability can achieve better safety outcomes than categorical tactical restrictions.

For now, Vermont has chosen to prioritize the deterrent effect of pursuit authority while addressing safety through improved compliance, better supervision, and removal of officers who demonstrate poor judgment. Whether this approach adequately protects public safety will become clearer as 2026 and 2027 data become available.