The cartel’s devastating impact isn’t measured by arrests, but by the ever-climbing number of overdoses in every corner of the Green Mountains.

by Compass Vermont

A startling article from The Boston Globe detailed a massive DEA operation that swept across New England, netting 171 suspected members and associates of the Sinaloa Cartel. The DEA’s top official in the region, Special Agent in Charge Jarod Forget, described the Mexican cartel as “by far the most dominant drug cartel throughout New England.”

The numbers were striking: 64 arrests in Connecticut, 49 in Massachusetts, 33 in New Hampshire. And in Vermont? Just three.

For many Vermonters, that number might bring a sigh of relief, suggesting the state has been spared the worst of the cartel’s influence. But the reality is far more sinister. The Sinaloa Cartel doesn’t need a large physical presence to wage its war. Its 21st-century business model is ruthlessly efficient, allowing its influence and its primary weapon—illicit fentanyl—to permeate the state. The cartel’s devastating impact isn’t measured by arrests, but by the ever-climbing number of overdoses in every corner of the Green Mountains.

A Modern Cartel: The Ghost in the Machine

To understand the cartel’s power, you have to forget the old image of drug lords personally running turf. The modern Sinaloa Cartel operates more like a multinational corporation with a franchise model.

• Manufacturing: Deep in Mexico, the cartel mass-produces fentanyl and methamphetamine in industrial-sized labs.
• Wholesale Distribution: They smuggle tons of this product across the border and sell it in bulk to major distributors in U.S. hub cities. For New England, those hubs are often in states like Massachusetts and Connecticut.
• Regional Franchisees: From these hubs, a decentralized network of smaller, often independent trafficking groups buys the product and pushes it into smaller markets like Vermont.

These “franchisees” are the ones who take the risks. They are the Tier 3 and 4 dealers in law enforcement’s hierarchy—the out-of-state traffickers who set up shop in a Vermont town for a few weeks, or the regional suppliers who send runners north. The cartel’s leadership, safe in Mexico, simply supplies the product and reaps the profits, insulated from the risks of street-level busts. This is why a DEA surge might round up dozens of associates in southern New England but find only a few in Vermont. The cartel doesn’t have to live here to do business here.

The Real Footprint: Fentanyl’s Deadly Toll

If the cartel’s physical presence is a ghost, its product is a monster. Fentanyl is the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18-45, and its grip on Vermont is devastating. The true measure of the Sinaloa Cartel’s success in the state can be found in the grim statistics from the Vermont Department of Health.

In 2023, 248 people died from opioid overdoses in Vermont, a staggering number for one of the nation’s least populous states. Fentanyl was involved in over 90% of those deaths.

These aren’t just numbers. They are our neighbors, family members, and friends. They are victims of a sophisticated international supply chain designed to profit from addiction. The cartel may not have an office in Burlington, but its product is reaching every community, leaving a trail of shattered families and straining the state’s emergency rooms, recovery centers, and morgues.

Vermont’s Two-Front War

Faced with this complex threat, Vermont is fighting a two-front war, tackling both the supply of drugs and the demand for them.

1. The War on Supply

This is the traditional law enforcement response. State, local, and federal partners, like the Vermont Drug Task Force and the DEA, work to intercept drugs and arrest the traffickers who bring them into the state. This work is dangerous and essential, but officials acknowledge they are fighting an enemy with nearly unlimited resources. As one trafficker is arrested, another, drawn by the immense profits, is always ready to take their place. This vital work is funded through standard state and federal budgets.

2. The War on Demand

This is where Vermont has become a national model. The state is using its multi-million dollar opioid settlement funds—money from lawsuits against the pharmaceutical companies that created the addiction crisis—to attack the problem at its root: addiction. The logic is simple: if you shrink the market, you shrink the cartel’s profits.

This is why, as some have noted, the settlement funds are not used for more police cruisers or drug task forces. By law, this money is designated for “opioid abatement,” which means:

• Harm Reduction: Getting life-saving naloxone (Narcan) into the hands of everyone who might need it.
• Treatment: Expanding access to medication-assisted treatment like buprenorphine, which is proven to reduce overdoses and help people achieve recovery.
• Prevention: Funding programs to stop addiction before it starts.

This strategy treats addiction as a public health crisis, not a moral failing. The goal is to keep people alive and help them recover, thereby eliminating them from the cartel’s customer base.

What Happens Next?

The struggle against the Sinaloa Cartel’s pervasive influence is far from over. The path forward involves a continued commitment to Vermont’s two-front war.

For law enforcement, the future lies in strengthening interstate partnerships to target the regional hubs in southern New England that feed the Vermont market. The fight requires looking beyond state borders to disrupt the supply chain at a higher level.

For public health officials, recovery advocates, and community leaders, the work is to build a true system of care that is accessible to all Vermonters. The historic influx of settlement funds provides a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build a robust network of treatment, recovery, and prevention services that can finally turn the tide on the demand for deadly drugs.

Compass Vermont is an independent, native publication focused on a collaborative resource model. This ensures thorough research and reporting that serves every resident, not just specific interest groups.