Was there a smarter path?

by Dave Soulia, for FYIVT.com

The State of Vermont has officially abandoned plans for a $50 million wildlife crossing along Interstate 89 after failing to secure the necessary federal funding, despite having already spent more than $2 million on planning, outreach, and design.

The proposed structure—a vegetated tunnel meant to allow wildlife safe passage between the Green Mountains and adjacent habitats—was slated for a stretch of highway between Middlesex and Waterbury. The idea stemmed from legitimate concerns: wildlife-vehicle collisions are a growing problem, and habitat fragmentation can have long-term ecological impacts. However, the decision to cancel the project, reported by Seven Days last week, has sparked questions about how the project was conceived and whether more modest alternatives were ever seriously considered.

$2 Million in Planning—With No Funding Secured

According to VTrans, approximately $1.6 million had already been spent on engineering, environmental reviews, and public engagement before the agency applied for federal support to fund construction. Another $400,000 in federal planning money was available and earmarked for the next phase, but with no full build funding in hand, the agency made the call to pull the plug.

This means roughly $2 million in public money was committed before the state knew whether the project was financially viable.

That order of operations—designing before securing build funds—is not unique to Vermont, but it does raise concerns about how infrastructure priorities are being scoped. As with any business decision, spending on plans without knowing whether you can afford the product invites waste.

A $50 Million Tunnel—or Something Else?

The wildlife crossing, as proposed, would have required extensive excavation and new construction under the highway. Renderings showed a landscaped corridor with boulders, trees, and stream-like features, suggesting a structure built not just for utility but also for appearance and ecological simulation.

While there’s no doubt that larger animals—such as moose, bear, and deer—can benefit from separated crossings, the $50 million price tag prompted skepticism. For comparison, wildlife overpasses in western states (Utah, Colorado, and Washington) have often been built for $5–15 million, using prefabricated spans and fencing to direct animals to safe points.

That begs the question: Why didn’t Vermont pursue a smaller, phased, or modular solution?

Cheaper Options on the Table?

Critics have noted that existing culverts and bridges might already support some wildlife passage—particularly for smaller species like foxes, raccoons, or amphibians—if combined with fencing or habitat improvements. For larger animals, a raised overpass or sloped land bridge could potentially be constructed at a lower cost over time.

Moreover, the effectiveness of wildlife crossings depends as much on guidance infrastructure—like roadside fencing and funnel paths—as on the crossing itself. In many documented cases, animals continue to cross wherever they find an opening unless deterrents are in place.

None of these components appear to have been integrated into the initial proposal. In fact, there is no indication that VTrans seriously modeled alternative designs with different price points or timelines. The project simply didn’t proceed once it became clear the full amount wasn’t available.

Planning Culture vs. Economic Reality

Vermont is not alone in planning first and scaling back later. But in a state where transportation budgets are tight and road maintenance backlogs are growing, spending millions to develop a project that was never financially viable raises broader concerns.

This story illustrates a pattern seen elsewhere in state government: a preference for best-case scenarios and full-scale solutions, rather than incremental, cost-effective planning. That culture can lead to impressive visuals and ambitious goals—but also wasted taxpayer dollars when those goals prove out of reach.

Would a $10 million version of the same crossing, built over time or retrofitted into existing structures, have had a better chance at success? Would the public have been better served by a strategy that began with fencing and monitoring, before committing to a large build?

These are business questions—not ideological ones. At the core is a simple idea: define the problem, model multiple solutions, and align the plan with realistic funding opportunities.

Conclusion

Vermont’s now-canceled wildlife crossing may not be the last of its kind proposed, but its short life offers a cautionary tale. Ambitious environmental infrastructure can be worth the investment—but only when it’s paired with funding certainty, alternative modeling, and real-world prioritization.

Otherwise, it’s just a $2 million tunnel to nowhere.